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REED V. REED AT 40:  






NINA TOTENBERG: I’m Nina Totenberg, and I’m delighted to be 
here at this wonderful event celebrating the fortieth anniversary of Reed v. 
Reed.1  If any of you are in the corridor, please come in.  Don’t be afraid to 
sit in the front; that’s where the seats are.  Actually, at this point, because 
this is still like class, everybody’s afraid to come to the front row.  There 
are so many professors here. 
This is really a wonderful event.  There are 700 people who are 
registered for it, and there’s another group of Georgetown Law students in 
an auditorium where this is being broadcasted.  And we have every school 
in the area cosponsoring: American University, George Washington 
University, Georgetown University, Howard University, and UDC 
Colleges of Law.  They all have their separate names, but I won’t go into 
that.  Also, the National Women’s Law Center and the Women’s Bar 
Association for the District of Columbia, and I don’t think I’ve left 
anybody out.  But if I have, I will be reminded of that, I’m sure. 
I am old enough that I actually remember Reed v. Reed being argued.  I 
was a novice Supreme Court reporter, brand new on the beat, and I didn’t 
know anything from Shinola, and I was just reading everything I could get 
my hands on.  And I found that, by and large, I really could understand 
                                                          
* Adapted transcript of Reed v. Reed at 40: Equal Protection and Women’s Rights 
held at the National Press Club on November 17, 2001.  Panel: Nina Totenberg, 
Legal Affairs Correspondent, NPR (moderator); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Principal Author of Brief for Sally Reed in Reed v. Reed; Emily Martin, Vice 
President & General Counsel, National Women’s Law Center; Professor Earl 
Maltz, Rutgers Law School; Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission; Professor Nina Pillard, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
 1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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things if I just read all the briefs.  But I came across this case, Reed v. Reed, 
which said that women were covered by the Fourteenth Amendment.  And 
I thought to myself, “Hmm, I thought the Fourteenth Amendment was for 
freed slaves and for blacks.  How does that apply to women?”  And I 
flipped to the front of the brief to see who had written it.  It was this 
Rutgers law professor named Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  And I said, “Well, I’m 
going to call her up.” 
I called her up and she gave me about an hour-long lecture, the bottom 
line of which is the Fourteenth Amendment says no person shall be denied 
equal protection of the law; and as she put it, the last she checked, women 
were people.  [laughter].  And it was the beginning of a long friendship and 
association, first on the phone and then in person.  And p.s., after my late 
husband died and I remarried, she performed the wedding ceremony.  She’s 
definitely a person. 
It’s my really nice duty to introduce her.  She’s the right person to be 
headlining this event since she did write the briefs in Reed.  And she will 
introduce the wonderful man who argued the case, who we’re very lucky to 
have in the audience today.  But none of us would probably be here in the 
jobs that we’re in without Ruth Ginsburg.  She truly revolutionized the law 
for women.  None of us work in a workplace that bears any resemblance to 
the workplaces of thirty and forty years ago.  I should just mention that 
Marcia Greenberger, who was going to be on this panel and who is co-head 
of the Women’s Law Center, but [was unable to make it at the last minute]. 
But I asked her last night, I said, “By the way, who provided the seed 
money for the Women’s Law Center way back when?”  I really couldn’t 
remember.  And she said, “The Ford Foundation did, and we were part of 
the Center for Law and Social Policy.”  And they decided that they would 
have a Women’s Law section of that, and they hired Marcia to do it.  Her 
first job was to ascertain whether there really was enough work for a single 
lawyer to do, because they assumed that there probably wasn’t and that she 
should do some other things as well.  So that’s how much life changed over 
the course of time.  So now, let me introduce Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  
[applause]. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: My role is simply to 
introduce Reed v. Reed in a nutshell.  Sally Reed lived in Boise, Idaho.  She 
was an everyday woman who made her living by caring for people unable 
to cope for themselves.  She had a son.  She and her husband were 
divorced.  When the boy reached teen years, the judge thought it was a 
good idea for him to spend some time with his father to be prepared for a 
man’s world.  Sally opposed that.  She didn’t think the father would be a 
very good influence on the boy.  And she was right. 
2
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One day, the boy was shot from one of his father’s rifles.  It was an 
apparent suicide.  Sally wanted to be appointed administrator of his estate, 
not for any economic advantage—there was very little there—but for 
sentimental reasons.  Her ex-husband put in a rival application and 
although his application was second in time, he was selected.  The probate 
judge had no choice.  The Idaho code read: “As between persons equally 
entitled to administer a decedent’s estate, males must be preferred to 
females.”2  Sally thought the law was unjust and she engaged a lawyer 
from Boise, Allen Derr, who is with us this afternoon.  [applause].  Allen 
took Sally’s case through three levels of the Idaho courts, losing in the first 
round, winning in the second, but then losing in the third. 
When Law Week reported the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Reed 
v. Reed,3 one of my colleagues at the ACLU, a great lawyer named Marvin 
Karpatkin, read the summary and said, “This will be the turning point 
gender discrimination case.”  And so the ACLU filed a request for Supreme 
Court review.  The Supreme Court took the case.  I then asked the ACLU’s 
legal director, Mel Wulf, if I could write the brief.  Allen Derr had said he 
was glad to have the ACLU do the written part, but he would present the 
case in the Supreme Court. 
I regard Reed v. Reed as the grandparent brief.  We had many other cases 
before the Court in the seventies.  They were all variations on the same 
theme.  A law that provides males must be preferred to females does not 
recognize women’s equal citizenship stature. 
To end this introduction, I will relate how the news of the Reed decision 
came to me.  I was coming home from Rutgers the evening of November 
22, 1971.  Seated in a train, I saw a man reading a newspaper that had a 
banner headline.  It filled the entire first page of The New York Post.  The 
headline read, “High Court Outlaws Sex Discrimination.”4  Well, we’ll find 
out if it did from our panelists.  [applause]. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: So in that regard, I just want to tell you one little 
story.  Last year, or the year before, there was a case at the Supreme Court 
involving the strip search of a high school girl after they found an Advil on 
her when there was no drugs permitted in school.5  The question was 
whether this was basically excessive, whether there were some grounds for 
a lawsuit.  It comes to the Supreme Court.  And at that point, Justice 
Ginsburg was the only—I guess it’s two years ago—was the only female 
                                                          
 2. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-314 (1948). 
 3. Wills and Estates, 38 U.S.L.W. 2481 (1970). 
 4. High Court Outlaws Sex Discrimination, N.Y. POST, Nov. 22, 1971, at 1. 
 5. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
3
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member of the Court.  And without regard to ideology, all of the male 
justices seemed to think this was no big deal.  I remember Justice Breyer 
saying he remembered people trying to stuff things in his pants and all 
kinds of stuff like that in the gym and at some point, this small person to 
my left lost her temper, basically.  And you could almost literally—I mean, 
I’m sitting there, I’m just going nuts.  I suddenly look up and I see the 
steam coming out of her ears.  At the end of the argument, it really didn’t 
look like this young woman and her mother would win a cause, the right to 
sue.  But as we left the press section—which these days is, I’d say, at least 
half female—all of the women were saying, “What’s wrong with those 
men? Are they crazy?”  And p.s., of course I don’t know what went on in 
the conference, but maybe they were all sufficiently humiliated by the press 
accounts that it turned out that she won. 
So, I want to introduce this panel and you all have biographies, so I’m 
not going to waste your time with anything special here.  I’m just going to 
say who all these folks are.  Jackie Berrien is head of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission; Earl Maltz is a professor at Rutgers 
Law School; Emily Martin is the Deputy Chair of the Women’s Law 
Center, pinch-hitting for Marcia Greenberger today; and Nina Pillard is a 
professor at Georgetown.  And, of course, any panel that has two Ninas on 
it has to be good. 
Each of these folks is going to speak for about five minutes.  They 
wanted to speak for ten, but I wouldn’t let them.  Who wants to go first? 
 
EMILY MARTIN: I think I’m first. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: You’re first? 
 
EMILY MARTIN: I believe so. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: So there’s a batting order here? 
 
EMILY MARTIN: There is. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: That’s been kept from the moderator.  Okay, I’ll 
let you guys go.  You will not hear from me for twenty minutes. 
 
EMILY MARTIN: Hello.  My name’s Emily Martin, and as Nina 
Totenberg more or less said, I’m Vice President and General Counsel at the 
National Women’s Law Center, and I’m very excited to be here today to 
talk about the watershed decision that was Reed v. Reed, when in a 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court for the first time in its history 
4
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struck down a law that discriminated against women in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  And what the Court said was to give a mandatory 
preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to 
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, so merely to make 
things more administratively more convenient, is to make the very kind of 
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
And it’s important to realize how different this was from the cases that 
had come before. The Supreme Court hadn’t heard a lot of gender 
discrimination cases prior to Reed v. Reed, but those that it had heard were 
very different in tone in the decisions.  So, just ten years before Reed v. 
Reed was decided, in Hoyt v. Florida,6 the Supreme Court had found that 
there was no constitutional problem with prohibiting women from serving 
on a jury unless they opted in to jury service affirmatively, which in 
practice meant there were no women on juries.  And the Court explained 
that was because women were the seat of home and family life.  And so 
obviously, it made sense to have this different rule. 
Basically, that holding echoed back to a Supreme Court decision almost 
100 years before, Bradwell v. Illinois,7 which was under a different clause 
in the Fourteenth Amendment—Myra Bradwell sought to practice law and 
was denied a law license because she was a woman and said this violated 
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  And 
the Court there said, “No, civil law as well as nature herself has always 
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man 
and woman.  Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.  The 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”8  So that notion 
of women being fundamentally different and creatures of the home really 
survived in law in many, many ways for the century after Bradwell until 
Reed v. Reed. 
And Reed really represented a historic change that began to fulfill the 
promise of the broad language of the Equal Protection Clause, which does 
prohibit denying any person the equal protection of the law. And it is 
important to recognize the Equal Protection Clause, there were 
conversations about how to draft it, there were versions that would have 
just prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or color or previous 
condition of servitude, those were rejected in favor of the broad promise 
that Reed recognized. 
                                                          
 6. 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
 7. 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
 8. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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Reed recognized the arbitrariness and, thus, injustice of assuming in law 
that men are more competent in regard to matters outside the home than 
women.  And in recognizing that, it was the seed of what becomes a very 
important principle in equal protection law: gender stereotypes, the over-
broad generalizations about how women are, how men are, what woman’s 
role is, and what man’s role is, are inappropriate bases for legal rules that 
say only men can do some things or only women can do some things. 
Later cases that came in the seventies and the forty years since have 
developed this jurisprudence in part by analogy to race, recognizing the 
parallels between how the law historically treated women and how the law 
historically treated people of color in denying them rights to serve on 
juries, rights to vote, and property rights. 
Through that analogy to race, which like sex is a highly visible 
characteristic with very little correlation to ability to contribute to society, 
through that analogy, the Supreme Court has developed intermediate 
heightened scrutiny for laws that discriminate on the basis of sex.  Which 
means that a law that distinguishes on the basis of sex is only constitutional 
if it is substantially related to an important state interest and based on an 
exceedingly persuasive justification, not a gender stereotype. 
The standard is generally understood to be somewhat more relaxed than 
the standard of review that applies to laws that discriminate on the basis of 
race, which is called strict scrutiny.  However, it’s so many miles away 
from where we were before Reed v. Reed, when in essence any law that 
discriminated on the basis of sex was presumed to be constitutional.  And 
as long as any sort of rationale could be dreamed up, whether or not it was 
the actual rationale that motivated the legislators, that was presumed to be a 
sufficient basis for a law that distinguished between men and women. 
So, in the cases that followed Reed, there were decisions that changed 
the world, that led to equal treatment and government benefits, for instance, 
discarding the legal presumption that the man is always the breadwinner 
and the woman is always the dependent.  For example, in 1975, in 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,9 another case brought by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
the Supreme Court opened the door for thousands of widowed fathers to 
receive social security benefits that before were only available to widowed 
mothers of dependent children.  This meant that thousands of working 
mothers were able to protect their families after their death through the 
benefits that they had earned by working in a way that was unavailable to 
them before this decision. 
Two years later in another case, Califano v. Goldfarb,10 it did away with 
                                                          
 9. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 10. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
6
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the dependency test for widowers to receive social security benefits.  There 
had been a rule that if you were a widow, you got social security benefits.  
But if you’re a widower, you had to prove that you’d actually been 
dependent on your wife, on the wage earner, in order to get those benefits.  
That rule was struck down, as based on gender stereotypes, in Califano v. 
Goldfarb.  And as a result, today tens of thousands of widowers are 
awarded these benefits every year.  Immediately after it was struck down, 
twenty times as many widowers received those benefits, which reflected 
the wage earning that their wives had done over the years. 
It changed the law in public education.  As a result, there have been 
cases ruling that public nursing schools, state nursing schools, must be 
open to men and that state military colleges must be open to women.  That 
neither can have single-sex admission policies based on assumptions about 
what sort of education is best for one sex or the other.  It led to a revolution 
in control over marital property as the Court struck down laws saying the 
husbands had exclusive control over jointly-owned property.  
Fundamentally, it led to a change in how we think about what is 
permissible and what the law can do—a change in the legal assumptions 
about how gender matters to the law. 
Now, not every distinction between men and women has been struck 
down under the Equal Protection Clause, but it took this protection first 
recognized in Reed v. Reed to reach many of these rules that today seem 
archaic but were the law of the land not so very many years ago. 
And so Reed and its progeny represent a strong and robust precedent.  
There are many cases in the forty years since Reed, reaffirming that the 
Equal Protection Clause provides heightened scrutiny to laws that 
discriminate against women.  But it’s important to recognize that this 
conversation is not completely settled, as we’ll hear today on this very 
panel.  Reed was decided unanimously; less than a handful of gender equal 
protection cases in the forty years since then have been decided without 
dissent.  And indeed, none in the past thirty years has been decided without 
dissent.  This area of the law remains contested with high stakes for 
women, and that’s one reason why we think it’s important to talk about this 
law and what it means today.  So with that, I will turn to my co-panelist, 
Professor Maltz. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: A few footnotes.  The quote 
you heard from Bradwell v. Illinois came from a concurring opinion.  The 
main opinion was the soul of simplicity.  It provided that the practice of 
law is not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship, or state 
7
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citizenship.11  One of the Justices, Justice Bradley, had an expansive view 
of the privileges and immunities clause, which he had just announced in 
dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases.  So he had to come up with a different 
reason to justify prohibiting women from practicing law.  He penned the 
famous line that comes just after the passage you heard.  He wrote, “This is 
the law of the Creator.”12  So nevermind the Constitution.  It was divine 
law that women should not serve as lawyers.  No one ever asked Justice 
Bradley by what means the law of the Creator was communicated to him.  
It wasn’t mentioned in any brief. 
I would like to mention just one other case, a decision that seemed to me 
the epitome of the way things were in the not so good old days.  The case is 
titled Goesaert v. Cleary,13 it was decided in 1948.  It involved a woman 
who owned a tavern.  Her daughter worked as her very able bartender.  But 
the state—Michigan—had a law that prohibited women from working as 
bartenders, unless they were the wife or the daughter of the tavern owner.  
The tavern owner had to be male. 
The Supreme Court didn’t get it in that case.  The Justices thought that 
women needed to be protected from the tough guys that sometimes 
frequent bars.  They didn’t think about the people who were bringing the 
drinks to the table.  They were women—waitresses—and they were in 
more danger than a person standing behind a bar.  Michigan’s law put 
mother and daughter Goesaert out of business with the cheers of the 
bartenders’ union.  That kind of thinking had absolutely nothing to do with 
the ability of the mother and daughter in question.  Simply because they 
were women, they couldn’t be bartenders. 
Emily Martin mentioned a number of cases.  You heard that widowers 
got the same rights that widows had enjoyed.  I was involved in those cases 
and some people said to me, “You’re supposed to be a women’s rights 
advocate.  But many of the cases that you’re bringing are about men’s 
rights.”  I responded, “Where does the discrimination start?  Why is the 
husband or the widower denied benefits?  The wife who’s a wage earner is 
paying the same social security taxes as her male peer, but her taxes do not 
get for her family the same protection.”  Yes, a man got the benefits as a 
result of the Court’s decisions.  But why did the law deny them to him?  
Because his wage-earning working wife was not considered to be a real 
worker.  She was considered, at most, a pin-money earner. 
Think, too, of the nursing school case, Mississippi University for Women 
v. Hogan.14  The case came up during Sandra Day O’Connor’s very first 
                                                          
 11. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139 (majority opinion). 
 12. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 13. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 14. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
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year on the Court.  Hogan was a man who wanted to attend what he 
considered the best nursing school in his State, but it was closed to men.  
Justice O’Connor wrote a fine opinion for the Court.  Between the lines 
you could glean what she understood.  She knew there’s nothing better for 
women in the nursing profession than to have men do that job, too.  When 
jobs are exclusively female, they tend to be underpaid.  Justice O’Connor 
thought the more men coming into the nursing profession, the better off 
everyone would be. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Okay, Professor Maltz? 
 
EARL MALTZ: I just have one comment that, looking around this 
room, I think it’s the tough guys in the bar who should have been worried.  
In any event, I want to thank everyone, the sponsors, for the opportunity to 
participate in this wonderful event.  It’s really an honor to be on such a 
distinguished panel.  But I’m here as the official representative of the dark 
side.  [laughter].  I believe that Reed v. Reed was wrongly decided, and it’s 
based on my general theory of constitutional interpretation rather than any 
particular views about the role of women in society or the particular statute 
in Idaho. 
My views are based upon three basic positions.  First, I am an 
unrepentant originalist.  I believe that in constitutional cases, judges should 
be bound by the meaning that can be derived by the legal materials that 
were available to those who drafted and ratified the relevant constitutional 
provision.  Second, I believe that in cases where the original meanings are 
unclear, there should be the presumption of deference.  And in case you’re 
wondering, I believe that the same presumptions should be applied in cases 
involving guns, property rights, affirmative action generally, and race-
conscious districting. 
Third, the historical record does not support the widely-shared view that 
in 1866, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment would be understood 
to constitutionalize open-ended notions of liberty, equality, or some similar 
concept.  The evidence on this point is particularly strong with respect to 
the Equal Protection Clause.  But unfortunately because I can’t explain that 
evidence, or go through that evidence in five minutes, I’m going to—well, 
no, if people are interested in talking about that evidence in the question 
and answer period, I’m particularly interested in it because I have no life.  
[laughter].  But I’ll be happy to discuss it during the question and answer 
period. 
Now, my basic view is because I think that judicial activism, which I 
define as the practice of invoking the Constitution to strike down either 
actions of state governments or federal legislature, carries with it 
9
et al.: Reed v. Reed at 40: Equal Protection and Women's Rights
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
  
324 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:2 
substantial costs.  First, there are the costs of uncertainty.  And second, 
there are the costs in terms of governmental flexibility.  That is, everyone 
would agree that the government shouldn’t be allowed to do certain things; 
to take a clear example that I think everyone in the room would agree with, 
the government should not be allowed to legalize slavery.  But I think also 
we would agree in general that the government needs to have flexibility to 
adapt to changing conditions.  Basically, what invoking the Constitution 
against particular kinds of practices does is to deprive the government of 
that flexibility. 
Now at this point, I’m going to have to talk real fast.  Originalist 
activism is not based upon a consequentialist analysis like this.  It’s based 
upon a purely formal idea that, basically, the courts are supposed to follow 
the Constitution for the same reason that they follow statutes.  And that’s 
what originalist activism is based on.  But in contrast to originalist 
activism, the basic justification for non-originalist activism is entirely 
instrumental.  That is, at least implicitly, that is the idea that at least in the 
long run, society will be better off if judges feel more or less free to enforce 
some set of values based on general ideas such as liberty, equality, or rights 
that are deeply rooted in our history and tradition, even if the framers had 
no way of knowing that the language would be interpreted that way. 
Now, one of the problems in evaluating this is each of us, if we could all 
say, “I don’t like this law, I don’t like that law, therefore, the Court should 
strike it down,” that would be easy.  If I were king of the world, we would 
do that.  If I were on the Court, I guess the address to write is 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue.  But the problem is we can’t do that.  We can’t 
know in advance what the ideology of judges are likely to be, and the same 
kind of philosophy that supports—in terms of judicial philosophy rather 
than political philosophy—decisions like Reed v. Reed also supports 
decisions like Cronson15 and such that are anathema to progressives. 
Now against this background, I suspect the affinity that many 
progressives apparently have for non-originalist activism is something of a 
hangover from the Chief Justiceships of Earl Warren and Warren Burger—
under Earl Warren where activism is invariably invoked in favor of 
progressive causes, and under Warren Burger, I think the cases of 
conservative activism were dwarfed by the liberal activism of cases such as 
Roe v. Wade.16  And even the far more conservative Rehnquist and 
Roberts’ courts have produced signal victories for progressives such as 
United States v. Virginia,17 Lawrence v. Texas,18 and Boumediene v. Bush,19 
                                                          
 15. Cronson v. Clark, 810 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 17. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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apparently creating the impression among some progressive commentators 
that, in the long run, non-originalist activism will have an inherent bias 
toward the left. 
For my progressive friends, I have a message.  From your perspective, 
non-originalist activism could easily have produced much worse results.  
One need only imagine a world in which the first George Bush, or as I refer 
to him George I, had selected a nominee whose ideology was a little less 
stealthy than David Souter.  The only thing that one can say for sure is that 
non-originalist activist decisions will be a lagging indicator of the political 
perspective of whatever portion of the legal and political elite that 
dominates the Court at some particular time.  One can have no assurance 
that the cumulative effect of those decisions will be positive in any 
meaningful sense. 
With the benefits thus uncertain and the costs clear, if I ruled the 
world—now there’s a grizzly thought—I would not have judicial review at 
all.  But because we have a written constitution, we’re likely to accept non-
originalist activism in clear cases.  Beyond that, I would leave the state 
governments and other branches of the federal government the flexibility 
necessary to do their jobs.  I concede I would lose the benefits of cases 
such as Reed and its progeny.  But on the other hand, progressives would 
not be stuck with decisions such as, for example, Citizens United.20  You 
know, it’s one of those things where you pay your money, you take your 
chances, and in the immortal words of The Who, “[P]ray we won’t get 
fooled again.”21  Thank you. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Nina, just a few comments.  
One is, did the Court spark resentment, resistance in Congress as a result of 
the decision in Reed v. Reed?  Quite the contrary.  What followed was a 
conversation between the Court and the Legislature.  In the wake of Reed, 
hundreds of laws, state and federal, were changed.  Congress went through 
all of the provisions of the U.S. Code and changed almost all that classified 
overtly on the basis of gender.  So Congress and the Court were in sync. 
I have a different originalist view.  I count myself an originalist, too, but 
in a quite different way than Professor Maltz.  Equality was the motivating 
idea, it was the idea enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.  But 
equality was not mentioned in the original Constitution.  Why?  Because 
the odious practice of slavery was retained.  So the equality principle does 
not appear in the Constitution until after the Civil War, when the 
                                                          
 19. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 20. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 21. THE WHO, Won’t Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT (Decca Records & Track 
Records 1971). 
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Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. 
The genius of the United States has been its growth capacity.  Recall that 
“We, the People,”22 were once white, property-owning men.  That concept, 
“We, the People,” has become ever more embracive.  Native Americans 
were originally not part of “We, the People,” nor were people held in 
human bondage, women, newcomers to our shores.  Today, “We, the 
People,” has a marvelous diversity, wholly absent in the beginning. 
Was women’s equality so far from the minds of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?  I don’t think so in this sense.  What they were 
getting at basically—you’ll find this cropping up again and again in the 
legislative record—they were against caste.  They did not want the United 
States to have any classes or castes that would identify people by their birth 
status.  They referred to the situation in India a number of times.  What 
they didn’t want was castes in the U.S.A. 
On the other hand, they surely did not consider women equal citizens.  
After all, women didn’t have what was the most basic right, the right to 
vote, until ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.  So I 
recommend to you a recent article by a professor who counts himself an 
originalist, Steven Calabresi of Northwestern.23  He explains that when 
women got the right to vote, that ended the possibility of leaving them out 
of the equality norm.  The Fourteenth Amendment was sparked by the idea 
that there should be no castes.  Its framers didn’t understand that the legal 
status of women resembled a caste system.  But when women were made 
full citizens, when they gained the right to vote, then, they were embraced 
as equals within the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Ms. Berrien? 
 
JACQUELINE BERRIEN: Thank you so much.  I will take a little of 
the time that I have to note that this is not only recognition of an important 
anniversary but also an event that has been organized to attract and to 
involve students from across the city in the various law schools, and I 
would be remiss if I didn’t say what a tremendous opportunity it is to be a 
part of this discussion, this historic discussion.  Justice Ginsburg, I have 
been privileged over my career to see you at work on the bench, and I 
fortunately began my career when Justice Marshall was still sitting on the 
bench.  And I have been privileged to work for both the ACLU Women’s 
Rights Project, which Justice Ginsburg founded, and the NAACP Legal 
                                                          
 22. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 23. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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Defense Fund, which Justice Marshall founded, so the connection between 
being a part of this discussion today and the things that I dreamed of doing 
when I was a student is something I want to note particularly for the 
students who are part of this audience today. 
I am a bit of an outlier in this discussion in this sense: I’m not going to 
focus on the Constitution and the constitutional standards, the professors 
will be focusing on those issues.  But I want to talk a bit about the role of 
the federal statutes and the federal enforcement structure that I am now 
responsible for leading at the EEOC.  And Justice Ginsburg’s remarks 
actually are a terrific segue to what I’d like to focus on. 
As the Justice said, Reed v. Reed opened important doors in terms of the 
constitutional analysis that applied to sex-based classifications in the law.  
But at the same time—and really I would say almost as bookends to what 
was happening in the courts in terms of constitutional litigation—Congress 
passed a range of statutes that were also addressing inequality and 
discrimination of various kinds.  And in some instances, the statutes were 
ahead of court decisions in terms of recognizing and protecting rights, and 
in other instances the statutes followed important court decisions like Reed 
v. Reed, as the Justice noted. 
So the importance of Reed, I think, is properly discussed alongside the 
significance of the whole range of statutes that Congress enacted and that 
the courts have interpreted over the years.  The Constitution and statutes 
have operated together to advance women’s rights in the workplace, and in 
other spheres of life as well. 
The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,24 which 
recognized women’s right to work free from various forms of sex 
discrimination.  The Equal Pay Act25 was passed a year before the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and initially was enforced by the Department of Labor.  
It was related to the Fair Labor Standards Act,26 which is the federal law 
that ensures that people who are working for pay receive the pay they’re 
entitled to.  And the Equal Pay Act ensured that you could not be paid less 
or be compensated differently for equal work based on your sex. 
In 1964, Title VII prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion and also prohibited 
discrimination in retaliation for exercising any rights under that statute.  
The EEOC has enforced that law for the last forty-six years.  We also 
                                                          
 24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 25. Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 26. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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enforce the Equal Pay Act today.  We enforce the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act,27 which was passed by Congress in 1978 after two 
Supreme Court decisions called into question whether Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination meant that employers could not 
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy.  We also enforce the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act,28 the Americans with Disabilities 
Act,29 and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act.30 
And I mention those because one of the real hallmarks of our 
enforcement responsibility and reach today is that we not only enforce laws 
that obviously and directly relate to discrimination on the basis of sex, we 
also enforce laws that address other forms of discrimination that impact 
women, and as a result we must be mindful that workplace discrimination 
can occur in intersecting ways.  When a woman comes to us for assistance, 
we have to consider if more than one of the laws that we enforce might 
apply to her, and if her rights in the workplace and the remedies available 
to her are based upon multiple statutes.  For example, a woman with a 
family history of breast cancer who seeks assistance from us today could be 
simultaneously protected by Title VII and the Genetic Information Non-
Discrimination Act, depending upon the specific facts of her case.  We 
recognize that sex discrimination could be just one of the barriers to 
workplace advancement that a woman might encounter, and our outreach, 
public education, enforcement and litigation reflect awareness of the 
possibility of “intersectional” discrimination. 
So there’s no question that when you think about Reed v. Reed and 
what’s different in the workplace and what’s different for working women 
today, clearly the constitutional standards are critical.  But the statutes that 
were passed alongside, and as bookends to constitutional decisions like 
Reed are also critical and have played an important role in improving the 
quality of life and opening doors to a broader array of opportunities for 
working women and men. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: That leaves you, Nina. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Now, just—okay. 
 
                                                          
 27. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 
602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 29. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 30. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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NINA TOTENBERG: Originally, I thought you were going to come at 
the end, so okay.  Go for it. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: I’ll also come at the end.  
[laughter].  Title VII in ‘64, now that’s seven years before Reed, how did 
women get there?  Title VII was originally for race, national origin, 
religion.  And then a congressman from Virginia who wanted to defeat the 
measure said, “Well, women are discriminated against too, so why not put 
sex in there?”  He thought adding sex would help to defeat the entire Title 
VII.  Instead, sex came in by floor amendment and it stayed. 
In the same year Reed v. Reed was decided, the first ever Title VII 
gender discrimination case came before the Court.  It was a case called 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta.31  Ida Phillips was a woman who wanted to 
work for Martin Marietta.  She was a waitress and she knew that the pay 
was better at Martin Marietta.  But the company had a rule.  It was, “We do 
not hire mothers of preschool children.”  Fathers, of course, are welcome. 
A sex discrimination case was supported by the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund.  Why?  Ida Phillips was a white woman.  But the NAACP lawyers 
realized what a tremendous benefit a victory for Phillips could be for 
women of color, women in the same situation, women who had children, 
preschool children, and wanted the best paying job they could get.  There’s 
been a symbiotic relationship between race and sex, race discrimination 
cases under Title VII have been used as precedent for sex discrimination 
cases, and the other way around. 
The Supreme Court said that Martin Marietta could not say flat out, “We 
don’t hire women with preschool children.”  But the majority suggested 
that perhaps, if the employer could prove that having preschool children 
demonstratively affected women more than men, then maybe sex would be 
a so-called bona fide occupational classification. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a concurring opinion, said forget bona fide 
occupational classification.32  The Court appeared to be falling for the 
ancient canard Title VII should end—the notion that women are more 
responsible for children than men are, so women should be kept from the 
best jobs. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: I should say that I was at that argument, the 
Martin Marietta argument and I remember two questions that tell you how 
much times have changed.  I think it was Chief Justice Burger who said, 
“Well, there are certain skills that women have that are better for men.  For 
                                                          
 31. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 32. Id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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example, they’re the best typists.”  Of course, it turned out that the fastest 
typist in the world was a man.  And then I think it was Justice Stewart who 
said, “Well, you wouldn’t expect men to be stewardesses, would you?”  
[laughter].  They were different times, what can I say?  Okay, Nina Pillard? 
 
NINA PILLARD: Thank you, Nina, and thank you to all of you for 
being here.  Thank you to the National Women’s Law Center and the 
cosponsors, fellow panelists and Supreme Court oralist Allen Derr.  But 
especially thank you, Justice Ginsburg, for honoring us by being here today 
and for assisting us by being there in that day, in 1971.  It’s just really 
moving to be part of this with you. 
So I want to make three points.  I want to elaborate a little bit on what 
the principle is that’s at the core of the Reed v. Reed doctrine as it’s been 
carried forth in the sex discrimination equal protection cases.  And that’s 
this principle against stereotyping, or as it’s even more accurately been 
articulated by Justice Ginsburg in Virginia Military Institute,33 a principle 
against over-generalization based on sex.  And I want to talk a little bit 
about the impact of Reed v. Reed on Congress’s power to legislate.  And 
finally, if I have time, make a few comments about constitutional 
interpretation in response to Professor Maltz. 
One thing that strikes me about this case, though, just hearing the Justice 
recount the story of Sally Reed is how it was a tiny thing, in a way, that she 
stood up for.  Being the administrator of her son’s estate, it was a few 
hundred dollars and one way or another, it was probably going to be 
administered the same way.  But as the Justice said, she had a sentimental 
attachment to the idea of tending to her son’s business in this way.  It just 
makes me think so often, and I think in some ways increasingly, we think, 
“Oh, don’t make a federal case out of it.  Don’t fuss over things that we can 
just be generous and let roll.”  And I think those of you who are parents, 
this comes up constantly when you’re navigating if there’s a co-parent on 
the scene.  “Oh, should I just make a deal out of this or not?”  And those 
are things that are very fraught with equality implications.  And I just want 
to sort of remark that we’re so fortunate that Sally Reed did make a big 
deal out of this and that these really small issues in the real world add up to 
and reinforce really major principles that really transform our lives. 
So, what Reed v. Reed characterized as arbitrary was this notion that men 
would be better administrators.  And we now know that sex-based 
classifications in the law are subject to heightened scrutiny, intermediate or 
skeptical scrutiny.  But when the Court decided Reed, it didn’t actually 
adopt any new level of scrutiny.  It purported to be applying rational basis 
                                                          
 33. Va. Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993). 
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review.  Of course, looking at it in hindsight we know that just the kinds of 
rationales that were brought forward by the state—that generally men 
would be more comfortable with administering an estate—are the kinds of 
things that would be fine under rational basis review, but that the higher 
level of scrutiny really digs into and rejects. 
So we see in Reed the seeds of this opposition to reliance on over-broad, 
sex-based generalizations.  So when we see people concluding in policy or 
in law that there needs to be a line between the treatment of men and the 
treatment of women because men are a certain way or women like certain 
things, or don’t like certain things, that’s the thing that raises the 
constitutional red flag under equal protection.  And the thing that’s sort of 
distinctive about this is that, even if government action is done without any 
invidious motive, any kind of anti-woman bigotry or any real effort to 
denigrate women or men in any regard, it’s the over-generalization that is 
seen as driving the harm. 
And in fact, one of the things that was sort of tricky at the beginning of 
sex discrimination, both statutory law and constitutional law, was this sense 
that nobody means any harm.  And so there’s a way in which the over-
generalization principle gives us a way of rooting out the kind of lazy or 
unnecessary reliance on sex as a criterion, when other more relevant 
criteria are available. 
And Reed is very alive.  There was a case just last term, the Flores-
Villar34 case, in which the Court of Appeals had sustained a sex-based 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.35  And that case was 
actually the lower court opinion upholding this sex-based distinction and 
was affirmed by an equally divided court four-four.  And the ninth justice 
was Elena Kagan.  And because she had dealt with this issue as Solicitor 
General, she recused herself.  So you see how important the latest 
appointment to the Court is.  That when she logs in on this issue, she’s 
going to be the tiebreaker. 
Just a couple of words about congressional power.  On the face of Reed 
v. Reed, and in its most immediate and direct applications, it’s about 
constraining governmental action.  If the statute at the state level or at the 
federal level uses this sex-based classification, Reed v. Reed says we’re 
going to look at that and maybe reject it.  But a less obvious implication of 
Reed that’s just as important is that it empowers government to work 
against sex discrimination.  It is the basis on which Title VII and the many 
laws that the EEOC, under Jackie Berrien’s leadership, the basis on which 
those laws can be applied to state employer, notwithstanding the states’ 
                                                          
 34. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011). 
 35. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) 
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sovereign immunity from Commerce Clause legislation.  So there’s a way 
in which it’s because there’s special heightened scrutiny for sex 
discrimination that Congress has the power to use the strong tools to go out 
and eradicate sex discrimination. 
There was a case called Nevada v. Hibbs,36 which sustained as anti-sex 
discrimination legislation, the Family and Medical Leave Act.37  And that 
case was decided by a court after a line of cases that had invalidated other 
laws.  There was a case invalidating provisions of the Age Act and a case 
invalidating provisions of the Disabilities in Employment Act because 
Congress wasn’t thought to have the power to apply those laws, at least to 
state employees. 
The reason why the Family and Medical Leave Act was sustained and 
why Title VII also applies, the 1964 act also applies to state employers, is 
because of the Reed principle, because of the greater constitutional scrutiny 
that’s given to classifications that are based on sex.  So when you’re talking 
about kind of institutional competence and whether it should be Congress 
or whether it should be the Court, it’s important to know that the fate of the 
two powers, the judicial power to enforce equality and the congressional 
power to act and enforce equality, are very linked and really go back to 
their roots in Reed. 
And just a couple of comments about originalism.  You know, we’re all 
originalists to the extent that we all consider ourselves to be bound by the 
Constitution.  But, what Professor Maltz so ably argued is a view that I 
don’t share, and I think shouldn’t be applied to the Equal Protection 
Clause.  He said, among other things, the Framers had no way of knowing 
the Equal Protection Clause would be interpreted in the way it was in Reed.  
And I would say that at some level, that’s true, they had no way of knowing 
we’d have iPhones today.  But they did anticipate the kind of change that 
we’ve seen in a broad sense.  The language of the Equal Protection Clause 
is broad; it’s pitched at a high level of generality, and purposely so.  The 
Framers wrote the most important provisions of the Constitution generally 
because they anticipated that, over time, new circumstances would demand 
that we take these general principles and apply them to new facts. 
And our Constitution did not have to be a broad brush in that way.  
There are plenty of state constitutions and constitutions of other nations 
that are written much more precisely and are much more frequently 
amended.  But the choice of the broad terms is really an invitation to the 
kind of common law case-by-case interpretation that the courts engaged in. 
 
                                                          
 36. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 37. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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NINA TOTENBERG: Justice Ginsburg? 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: One point about Nevada v. 
Hibbs, which upheld against constitutional challenge the family leave 
provisions of the Family Medical and Leave Act.  As one lives, one learns.  
Recall the author of the opinion, the Title VII opinion, in Gilbert v. 
General Electric,38 holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is 
not discrimination on the basis of sex.  That same Justice, my later Chief, 
wrote the opinion for the Court in Hibbs upholding the relevant provisions 
of the Family Medical and Leave Act.  Chief Justice Rehnquist explained 
why it was important that this leave be given to men as well as women, 
because men are, or should be, caretakers of the family as women are.  In 
fact, when I brought the opinion home to my dear husband, the opinion in 
Nevada v. Hibbs, he said, “Ruth, did you write that?”  [laughter]. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: So when you said he lived and learned, do you 
suppose that might have had something to do with the fact that he had a 
daughter? 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Maybe even more, he had 
granddaughters. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: That’s true.  So, I’m going to ask a couple of 
questions first to the whole panel, and I’m also going to urge the panelists 
to ask each other some questions.  My broad question for the whole panel, 
as somebody who has fortunately lived through this revolution, is we are 
celebrating the anniversary of Reed v. Reed, but do you really think that 
there now are so many statutes protecting women’s rights that would it 
matter terribly if, now, there weren’t Reed v. Reed?  There’s employment 
pay, all kinds of statutes that protect women’s rights.  And the women 
sitting in this room are a sort of testament to that.  So, if tomorrow there 
weren’t Reed v. Reed there, would it make a huge difference?  Even 
assuming that everything stays as it is, does it matter that we don’t have 
strict scrutiny as opposed to heightened scrutiny?  Haven’t we ended up, in 
some sense, almost in the same position?  Jackie? 
 
JACQUELINE BERRIEN: Well, I think Nina actually made the point 
very well.  I don’t think it’s an either/or.  I think that the statutes and the 
constitutional standards are very symbiotic and that the authority that 
Congress has in its perception, and really the public perception, the public 
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that elects those members of Congress and its belief about whether 
Congress has not just the authority but I’ll say the responsibility to act to 
address conditions that it finds in society.  And that it is rooted in 
constitutional principles, I think is significant in our structure of 
government, in the system in which we live.  And I think that’s exactly 
why the organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project focused not only on how the statutes would be 
interpreted, but also ultimately on what the constitutional underpinning for 
those statutes would be.  Clearly, the statutes have made in terms of real 
application of the Constitution a tremendous, tremendous difference in 
every way. 
Title IX is another great example.  It’s not a part of the Civil Rights Act.  
But Title IX, which removed many of the barriers to women’s 
participation, women and girls participation in sports and educational 
opportunities, has made a tremendous difference.  But the fact that 
Congress acts, and that the public understands that Congress acts, based on 
an understanding of what the Constitution requires for all of the people of 
the nation is significant.  And that is what the Fourteenth Amendment is 
about, is protection for the people. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Professor Maltz? 
 
EARL MALTZ: I’d just like to observe one thing about that, 
specifically in connection to Reed v. Reed.  It’s not an accident that Reed v. 
Reed was decided unanimously in 1971 because, and I know a few years 
before that in my mind is—I’m just getting old—that it was an almost 
unanimous Congress.  I know it wasn’t exactly unanimous, but an 
overwhelming majority of Congress had proposed the Equal Rights 
Amendment.  So my point about that in terms of my basic constitutional 
theory rap is that the reason it was unanimous is that it reflected basically 
the views of the governing elites of the time, both liberal and conservative.  
And as we see those views change for a variety of different reasons, we see 
a different change dynamic on the Court.  And that’s all I have to say about 
that. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Emily? 
 
EMILY MARTIN: Well, I think it would make a difference.  One 
reason is the reason that Nina Pillard talked about briefly, in that it makes a 
real difference as far as what laws Congress can pass, not just the very 
important symbolic foundational principle that the United States is a 
country in which men and women are equal before the law, which is 
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incredibly important.  But also in real terms whether when Congress passes 
a law against discrimination, it applies to state governments and how they 
treat their employees, or if it’s state run public housing, how they treat their 
tenants.  Whether Congress has the authority to tell state governments, 
“You can’t discriminate against women” really depends upon the 
heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause 
permits.  So in that way, it has an immediate concrete effect, even if we 
assume that statutory protections are strong and at this point not going to go 
away. 
But it’s also the case that while we do have very strong and important 
statutory protections in Title VII and Title XI and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and the Fair Housing Act against sex discrimination 
that it doesn’t cover the waterfront.  I also am very proud to say that I was a 
litigator at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project for many years, and we 
brought equal protection cases because sometimes you need the 
Constitution.  Sometimes, the Constitution doesn’t reach the question that 
you are talking about. 
Take a small example, one of the equal protection cases we brought was 
one about softball fields versus baseball fields in a municipality in 
Oregon.39  And the girls’ softball fields were terribly run down, and the 
boys literally had a stadium.  And because it was municipal fields, it wasn’t 
a school, Title XI didn’t reach it.  There’s no law that says that you can’t 
treat boys far better in your municipal athletics program than girls in your 
municipal athletics program except the Constitution.  And it’s a small case, 
but it’s an important principle, that sometimes you need that foundational 
rule, that foundational law that we treat people fairly here to reach 
inequities.  So I think the importance of Reed v. Reed lives on in many 
ways. 
 
NINA PILLARD: I mean, the way that I see it is without Reed, there 
would be nothing wrong under the Constitution with states using sex-based 
generalizations.  For example, about men’s and women’s different work 
and family roles.  And they could use those generalizations to drive policies 
about, well, let’s not really give leave to men because it’s really women 
who need it, I mean, generally, on average.  And let’s not give these 
challenging jobs to women because, I mean generally, typically on average, 
women are going to have babies and they’re going to run home and not 
really be as committed to the workforce. 
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I mean, those are the over-generalizations that although true in some 
factual, general sense, are the very thing that we use this constitutional test 
to sort of discipline.  And if we really lived in a world in which we didn’t 
have any constitutional rule against that kind of over-generalization, then 
we would disadvantage the atypical people who really are the spearhead of 
social change on gender roles.  And what do I mean by that?  The law 
stands out and protects someone who wants to be the stay-at-home dad, 
even though he’s atypical.  If you didn’t have the rule against over-
generalizations, and if you had policies that were driven by what women 
and the men generally want, you wouldn’t have protection for him. 
The woman who decides she wants to run for President.  It’s part of our 
attitudes, it is part of our constitutional law, that even though typically, 
maybe, people of one gender or another don’t want to do these things, that 
we want to privilege the atypical, we want to see how far genders can go 
out of our kind of more majoritarian, more conventional impulses.  I was 
thinking about this panel, and I was thinking about forty years ago and 
when I was about a little younger than my daughter is today, and I was 
thinking about how much more athletic opportunity kids have and how they 
do things in sports that we thought women were physically incapable of 
doing.  And that is because we’ve tested ourselves, our own impulses in 
part with the help of this Reed principle. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Before that little voice says to me, “Nina?”  
[laughter].  Do you have anything you want to say?  You can pass if you 
want to. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Why 1971?  Why was that 
the year?  Professor Maltz referred to the governing elites that sent out the 
Equal Rights Amendment for ratification.  I think the idea started with the 
people.  There was, at the start of the seventies, a burgeoning women’s 
rights movement, a revival of the women’s rights movement not only in the 
United States, but all over the world.  As a great professor of constitutional 
law, Professor Paul Freund, famously said, “The Supreme Court should not 
be affected by the weather of the day.  But inevitably, the Court will be 
affected by the climate of the era.”40  The climate of the era, I think, was 
responsible for the different responses the Supreme Court gave in 1961 and 
in 1971.  In 1961, the liberal Warren Court said it was okay not to put 
women on jury rolls.  The not so liberal Burger Court said it’s not okay to 
exclude Sally Reed from being an administrator of an estate.  So it was the 
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movement in society for change.  It has to start with the people.  And if it 
doesn’t, then nothing’s going to happen in government circles. 
Yes, the people’s elected representatives can take account of the climate 
of the era.  That’s their job.  But remember that after World War II, 
constitutional courts were created in a number of European countries to 
rule definitively on constitutional questions, including questions involving 
basic human rights.  Why?  Because Europe had seen that popularly elected 
legislatures cannot always be trusted to keep society in tune with its most 
basic values.  So a detached, impartial, removal-proof body, a 
constitutional court, would help to ensure against a return to the kind of 
autocratic governments that did not respect human dignity. 
The idea of a court performing this role, the role of reviewing legislative 
and executive acts for constitutionality, really took off after World War II.  
It did so in the wake of a most virulent brand of racism, to which good 
people said, “Never again.” 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: You know, it’s very interesting to me, I’m doing 
something that I—for those of you who haven’t done it—suggest you do it, 
and that is read Jeff Shesol’s book called Supreme Power,41 which is about 
the Roosevelt court-packing plan.  And many of the ideas, for example, that 
we hear out of Newt Gingrich’s mouth today, were coming out of the 
mouth of Franklin Roosevelt then.  And it is just really fascinating to see 
the shoe on the other foot in a different era and to see the Court in the 
middle.  And in the case of the court-packing plan, the Court actually did 
start to change because of the climate of the era, you could argue.  But it’s 
worth thinking about and remembering. 
Professor Maltz, I wanted to ask you one question and you’re really to be 
commended. To come to an event like this and be the— 
 
EARL MALTZ: I’m used to it.  [laughter]. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Be the pincushion, as it were, for everybody 
here almost, is that—but I did want to ask you one thing.  And that is if you 
look at the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and their intent and what 
I thought as a young reporter just reading the briefs, you would have to say, 
though, that the Court was wrong in Brown,42 too, because certainly the 
Court did not envision integrated schools in the District of Columbia.  This 
was a sleepy southern city in which they were very much segregated, and 
that wasn’t contemplated at the time.  In fact, education was even 
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somewhat different at the time. 
 
EARL MALTZ: Yes. Look, can I just say a couple of things? 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: You can say anything you want. 
 
EARL MALTZ: Really?  [laughter].  I want to start, if I can, with 
talking about what Justice Ginsburg and what Nina said about, other Nina, 
said about the language of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: That may be the only time in your life you ever 
get called “the other Nina.” 
 
EARL MALTZ: Long story, I’m going to have to make it really short.  
It’s not about protection of equal laws, it’s about equal protection of the 
laws.  And, as I say, I’m going to have to make it really—a complicated 
story made really—short.  There actually was something called the right to 
protection of the laws that was in Chancellor Kent, one of my friends, 
among other people, well established, prior to 1866.  And the rest of the 
problem is about the evidence.  Is that in fact, one of the things they were 
really concerned about was federalism and there was an earlier version of 
the amendment, which talked about giving Congress the authority to 
enforce equal protection of life, liberty, and property.  And it was defeated 
and every Republican who spoke against that amendment, that language, 
specifically complained about the fact that it was open-ended. 
And so to me, the evidence says we moved from this equal protection of 
life, liberty, and property, to equal protection of the laws.  As I say, it’s a 
long story, I’m sorry. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: It’s clear. 
 
EARL MALTZ: No, you’re not sorry I don’t go on longer about that, I 
assure you.  About Brown, yeah, you’re right.  Can’t get there.  I’m willing 
to say I can’t—a lot of people have tried to get there, can’t get there.  And 
for a lot of people, that’s sort of the end of the debate.  But it’s sort of like 
it seems to me, still, that there is—now, if I were in a different group, a 
very different group, a group of committed pro-life people—I doubt that 
there are a lot of committed pro-life people in this room, there might be 
some—they would say, “Yeah, but there’s also Roe,” which they see—
now, I understand that that viewpoint is foreign to most people in this 
room, but if you were a very committed pro-life person you would see—
Roe as basically constitutionalizing a really, really, really bad value. 
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And my point about that is all you can say is that over time, it gets back 
to my basic thing about what is described as judicial activism generally, but 
in particular what I describe as non-originalist or sometimes neo-originalist 
activism.  That what you are going to get is basically a lagging indicator of 
the views of a particular group—the pejorative term would be the 
“governing elite”—but basically the powerful people in the country who 
appoint people and are appointed to the Court. 
And since in my view, I know Keynes said “In the long run, we are all 
dead,”43 that in the long run, I don’t think that there is actually evidence in 
the long run that what I describe as judicial activism, has advanced society 
generally.  Again, the Warren Court is something of an anomaly.  And I 
think that there are costs.  And so I understand that I am sort of against the 
tide not only in this world, but the tide of world opinion or whatever about 
constitutional courts, but that’s my story and I’m sticking to it. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Well, I guess we know he’s not going to be 
nominated to the Supreme Court. 
 
EARL MALTZ: Not this year. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Not for a while.  [laughter].  Yes? 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Brown was a tremendously 
important decision, but it’s not the decision that ended apartheid in 
America.  That decision didn’t come until twelve years later.  The case was 
Loving v. Virginia,44 its target was miscegenation laws.  The law said, in 
effect, there is a lower caste and the dominant race is not to be made 
impure by mixing with the lower caste.  I don’t know, Professor Maltz, 
what you would say about miscegenation laws which several of our . . . 
 
EARL MALTZ: I’m against them. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: . . .Yes, of course you are.  
But would you have decided Loving v.Virginia differently? 
 
EARL MALTZ: Would I have decided Loving v. Virginia differently?  
Well, I could sort of dodge and say that—there’s a complicated relationship 
between theories of precedent and theories of originalism—I can say, “Oh 
look at Brown.”  I guess I’m going to have to admit that I think it’s very 
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difficult to get to most of the Warren Court decisions about segregation and 
miscegenation and such was an originalist theory.  Can some people say, 
“Oh, that’s easy for you to say?  Here he is, a privileged white male.”  But, 
it is what it is. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Jackie, could I ask you about—we have been 
talking a great deal about women.  I’m wondering how much there is of 
discrimination against men that comes to the EEOC?  And other kinds of 
discrimination that most people don’t think of, frankly? 
 
JACQUELINE BERRIEN: Sure.  Well, I think it’s important to 
remember that what Title VII prohibits is discrimination on the basis of 
sex.  So it does not apply only to women, by any means.  And just as 
Justice Ginsburg mentioned earlier, the first case the Supreme Court 
decided under Title VII and its sex discrimination provision, was argued by 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and it wasn’t obvious, perhaps, to some 
why that made sense.  But one of the reasons was that the Fund also 
recognized that the way that Title VII was interpreted would impact 
everyone who was protected by Title VII.  And that went beyond the 
immediate facts of the specific case. 
And I should mention that the person who argued that case is an EEOC 
alum, Bill Robinson, and is also affiliated with the D.C. School of Law 
represented here today. 
Ultimately, we do continue to see a full range of cases brought by men 
and women that are challenging various forms of sex discrimination.  We 
get harassment cases, for example, that involve men who have been 
harassed either by other men, more often by other men in the workplace.  
We have resolved those both in court and in out-of-court settlements.  As 
several people have mentioned today, the principles that have supported 
things like the Family Medical Leave Act, certainly as we interpret and 
apply not only Title VII but also the related statutes like the Family 
Medical Leave Act, what’s important is not whether the person who brings 
the case is a man or a woman.  What’s important is whether there is 
discrimination in granting leave or in a term of condition of employment 
that is prohibited by the law. 
And certainly we have, for example, equal pay cases that are brought not 
only by women but by men of various races.  I would be remiss if I didn’t 
say here, as I sit here as the African American woman on this panel, that 
part of the discussion—and perhaps it’s inevitable because of the different 
standards under the constitutional interpretation of the Court—part of the 
discussion has proceeded under a construct that women have no race, or 
that people of color have no sex.  And obviously, neither of those things are 
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true. 
And it’s also true in terms of the EEOC and its enforcement 
responsibility that we see people workers, both male and female, who are 
coming to us with a range of complaints or range of concerns about 
conditions in the workplace.  So, for example, when we had a meeting 
earlier in the year about the issue of how people who are unemployed are 
treated in job announcements, whether announcements and other efforts by 
employers to recruit employees can exclude the unemployed.  One of the 
people who testified was Fatima Goss Graves from the National Women’s 
Law Center, and she was able to talk about the impact of that policy on 
women.  It may not have been intuitive to some that there might be 
different aspects of how that policy might affect women. 
And she was able to talk about, for example, for some women care-
giving leave may be the reason that they are unemployed at the time they’re 
seeking employment.  So the assumption that a person who’s unemployed 
may be less qualified for particular work would be not only invalid, but 
would effectively impact them on the basis of their care-giving 
responsibilities and sex. 
So really, I would say that now we are committed to looking at any 
policy that comes before us, any claim, and being sure that while there may 
be an obvious ground that we’re not only looking at it from the standpoint 
that may first, or immediately, present itself and that we really look at a 
broad range of issues that might affect different people in the workplace in 
different ways. 
The Center last week, exactly a week ago, recognized women who were 
part of the Freedom Rider Movement, and it was a tremendous, tremendous 
recognition.  And I think it is an appropriate thing to happen in the same 
month that the Center is recognizing this anniversary of Reed.  Because the 
truth is that both in court and out of court, it’s been action that a lot of 
people, many of them ordinary people, as you heard today, about the 
people who were involved in the Reed case, the people who made a 
difference, the women who made a difference in the Freedom Rides; those 
are the people who in many ways have stepped up to open the doors.  And 
while the constitutional standards and decisions are things that live with us 
and are an important legacy, it’s certainly true that as Nina Pillard said 
earlier, those people’s willingness to come forward are a critically 
important part of how I know I sit here today with the opportunities that are 
available to me and the commitment that I feel today to continue to broaden 
those opportunities for other girls and women who come behind me, as 
well as men and boys. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: So, I wanted to leave a few minutes to take some 
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questions from the audience before we—believe it or not, we’ve eaten up 
an hour and twenty-one minutes.  It doesn’t seem that long at all.  So let me 
just ask for a few questions.  Yes, over here? Hold on a second, I think 
somebody’s got a microphone. 
 
AUDIENCE: I have a question about the separate standard—the 
intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination.  I was wondering what the 
Court’s rationale was for deciding on the separate standard?  Do you think 
it’s rightly decided, and what effect does this have on cases where there is 
an intersection between, for instance, race and sex? 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Examples work more forcibly 
on the mind than precepts.  I wonder about law schools that teach you there 
are three tiers; there’s rational basis; then there’s intermediate scrutiny; 
and, finally, there’s suspect classification.  My counsel would be, watch 
what the Court does more than what it says.  In Reed, the Court purported 
to use the lowest tier—rational basis review.  And yet, a unanimous court 
struck down an overt sex-based classification. 
I like the expressions, heightened scrutiny, skeptical scrutiny, and 
exceedingly persuasive justification.  Does it make any difference that 
those are used words.  Remember the birth of the strict scrutiny standard.  
The Supreme Court first enunciated that standard in a case called 
Korematsu.45  The Court’s decision justified detaining people on the basis 
of their race and national origin, justified rounding them up and putting 
them in detention camps for the duration of World War II.  Strict scrutiny 
was the standard, but the result today, I think—whatever the standard 
invoked—would be government cannot do that. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: In other words, watch what we do, not what we 
say.  Nina Pillard? 
 
NINA PILLARD: I was just going to add, I think that the Justice is 
exactly right.  There are rational basis cases like Reed that are rational 
basis, arguably, with teeth.  There are intermediate scrutiny cases like the 
Virginia Military Institute case that really sound like strict scrutiny cases 
and use a different formulation, skeptical scrutiny.  So I think there’s really 
a range of different ways in which the courts confront specific scenarios 
and test them and try to use a form of analysis that’s going to root out 
harmful discrimination. 
I think just the short answer to the first part of your question, why was it 
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intermediate?  I think at the time that analysis was adopted, it was thought 
that there were probably a bunch of kinds of sex-based classifications that 
would be okay more so than race-based classifications.  And one thing that 
we’ve seen is that the more experience we have with sex equality, the 
harder it is to really see where men need to be excluded or women need to 
be excluded and where roles need to be assigned based on sex. 
And so the standard, I think, has sort of drifted toward a strict scrutiny 
standard in practice because the practice that we have, the experience that 
we have, makes us more confident that full equality is going to work. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Anybody else?  Yes? 
 
AUDIENCE: So the strip search of the high school girl case was 
mentioned, but in cases that are less obviously about gender explicitly, 
what do you think the effect of the genders of the justices has on their 
decisions? 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: Oh, I’m going to give that one to Justice 
Ginsburg. 
 
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: I will quote the line Justice 
O’Connor often uses.  It was first expressed by a judge of the Supreme 
Court of Minneapolis, Jeanne Coyne: “At the end of the day a wise old man 
and a wise old woman will reach the same judgment.”46  But, Justice 
O’Connor would add, and as I would, “We bring to the table something 
that is lacking.  We bring knowledge gained from growing up inside a 
female body.”  The Safford47 case, the strip search case, is a perfect 
example.  Every woman would understand what a mortifying experience 
that was for a thirteen-year-old girl.  Every man did not have that 
understanding.  It was good to have people at the table who could explain 
the girl’s extreme discomfort to others. 
The most important thing, I think, is the public perception of the Court 
these days.  Now one-third of the members are women, and we’re all over 
the bench.  When Justice O’Connor left, for a couple of years, I was the 
lone woman.  I’m not a very large person.  It wasn’t the right picture.  But 
now, I am seated near center and Justice Kagan sits to my left, Justice 
Sotomayor, to my right.  It looks like we’re really there.  Women belong on 
the Court and it will never be otherwise.  Those of you who have attended 
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court hearings lately will have observed that my two newest colleagues are 
hardly shrinking violets.  [laughter]. 
 
NINA TOTENBERG: I have to say, as somebody who’s covered the 
Court for many decades, I certainly knew that there were three members of 
the Court who were female when Justice Kagan, the first day that Justice 
Kagan was sitting for oral argument.  But to walk into that courtroom and 
see, and they are brackets.  There’s a woman at each end, and because of 
seniority, Justice Ginsburg is quite close to the center.  To walk into that 
courtroom after years in which there was decades I covered the Court in 
which there were no women.  And then there was one, and then there was 
two, and it was back to one again.  To see that sort of density, it was 
really—you try as a reporter not to have a stake in cases that are before the 
Court.  But, to walk into that courtroom and see that, it just really made my 
heart swell with pride to be able to see that in my lifetime.  Anybody else? 
Well, okay.  We’ve done this exactly on time.  But that’s what you 
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